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Punitive Damages after BMW v. Gore (1996) 
Fred W. Morgan and Karl A. Boedecker 
The U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in BMW v. Gore (1996) in May. This 
decision triggered another round of discussions regarding restraints on punitive damages 
as a part of the overall reform of the U.S. tort system. Here, the authors review the BMW 
decision and its immediate predecessors to illustrate the essential public policy issues that 
are associated with proposed limits on punitive damages. 
Punitive damages generally are levied against defen- 
dants who recklessly or flagrantly violate victims' 
rights. Punitive damages originated to punish perpe- 
trators of intentional torts and therefore have a hybrid orien- 
tation that falls between civil cases involving only compen- 
satory damages and criminal cases (McKown 1995, p. 423). 
Product liability commentators have disagreed about the 
applicability of punitive damages because of this quasi- 
criminal flavor. In addition, because strict liability1 is often 
the basis for a product liability claim, experts have sug- 
gested that punitive damages are difficult to determine, if 
not altogether inappropriate (ALR 4th 1996). 
Over the past decade the U.S. Supreme Court has 
reviewed several cases involving contested punitive dam- 
ages awards (Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal 
1989; Honda Motor v. Oberg 1994; Pacific Mutual Life 
Insurance v. Haslip 1991; TXO Products v. Alliance 
Resources 1993). The Court has declined to set specific lim- 
its on punitive damages, either an absolute amount or rela- 
tive to compensatory awards. Commentators have reviewed 
these decisions, often disagreeing strongly with the reason- 
ing and implications of the Court's rulings (see, e.g., Cutter 
1995; Dragutsky 1994; Schwartz and Behrens 1993). In 
May 1996, in BMW of North America v. Gore (1996), the 
Court had another opportunity to develop clear standards to 
guide the application of punitive damages. Once again, the 
Court chose to leave these decisions at the state level. 
Our purpose is to examine primary public policy issues 
surrounding the appropriateness of punitive damages 
awards. We first provide a historical perspective on the role 
of punitive damages. We then offer an assessment of the 
scope of punitive damages in U.S. product liability litiga- 
tion. We next review recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
that have dealt with policy issues surrounding punitive dam- 
ages. We then analyze these issues in detail, adding our own 
views of how punitive damages should be handled by courts 
and legislatures. 
History and Role of Punitive Damages 
We now look at the origins of punitive damages and trace 
their evolution to the present. 
Evolution of Punitive Damages 
Early Origins 
The doctrine of punitive damages has deep roots in Anglo- 
American law, and its origins can be traced to Mosaic law, 
which specifies payment by wrongdoers beyond the amount 
necessary to compensate their victims for direct losses. 
Therefore, when someone wrongfully took the animal of 
another and converted it to his own use, the rule was clear 
(The Jerusalem Bible 1971, Exodus 21:37): "If a man steals 
an ox or a sheep and then slaughters or sells it, he must pay 
five oxen for the ox, four sheep for the sheep." 
Similarly, a payment to the wronged person would serve 
as both compensation and punishment in situations in which 
difficulty might occur in fixing actual damages for a civil 
violation (The Jerusalem Bible 1971, Exodus 22:15): 
If a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed and sleeps with 
her, he must pay her price [mohar, the "bride price" paid by a 
betrothed man to the family of his future wife] and make her his 
wife. If her father absolutely refuses to let him have her, the 
seducer must pay a sum of money equal to the price fixed for a 
virgin. 
The ancient Greeks recognized the use of payment by 
wrongdoers to victims, in addition to other legal admoni- 
tions (Walther and Plein 1965, p. 377, citing Plato, The 
Laws IX, p. 106): 
When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law 
will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like 
again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; 
and he must in addition pay for the hurt. 
English Origins 
Statutory provisions for punitive damages, in the form of 
double or treble damages in civil suits in which a tenant 
allows avoidable harm to real property, can be traced as far 
back as The Statute of Gloucester (1278, p. c5) in medieval 
England. A series of eighteenth century common law deci- 
sions established the principle that juries could assess dam- 
IStrict liability is a public policy liability theory, which is based on insur- 
ance concepts of risk-spreading and placing the burden of liability on the 
seller who is better able to bear and spread the costs of consumers' injuries. 
Strict liability does not require negligent behavior by the defendant; hence, 
behaviorally based punitive damages awards could be conceptually 
inappropriate. 
FRED W. MORGAN is a professor, Carol Martin Gatton School of 
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ages in excess of actual losses when it was necessary to pun- 
ish the defendant and deter such conduct in the future. In a 
widely cited case, Wilkes v. Wood (1763), the court upheld 
an exemplary damage award in which little actual harm had 
occurred. Lord Halifax, Secretary of State to King George 
II, issued an improper warrant to suppress publication of 
The North Briton. British officials searched the house of 
John Wilkes, the publisher, who then sued for "large and 
exemplary" damages as a means of deterring such conduct. 
The court awarded 1,000 pounds to Wilkes, which Massey 
(1995) equates to $1.5 million in 1995. 
Huckle v. Money (1763) arose from the same series of 
events. A journeyman printer employed by Wilkes was 
arrested and confined under the same improper warrant. He 
received damages of 300 pounds (nearly 300 times his 
weekly earnings) in his action for trespass and false impris- 
onment. In response to the defendant's vigorous protest 
about the size of the award even though no actual injury 
occurred, the court declared (Huckle v. Money 1763): 
I think they [the jury] have done right in giving exemplary dam- 
ages. To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in 
order to procure vidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a 
law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was 
a most daring public attack made upon the liberty of the subject. 
Other cases from the same era provided large awards to 
plaintiffs who had suffered little actual harm (Note 1957) 
from instances of slander (Hawkins v. Sciet 1622), malicious 
prosecution (Leith v. Pope 1780), criminal conversion 
(Duberley v. Gunning 1792), seduction (Tullidge v. Wade 
1769), and battery (Benson v. Frederick 1766). 
By the early nineteenth century, English common law 
allowed a jury to award far greater than the actual money 
damages to deter improper conduct. Therefore, a court 
upheld a jury verdict of 500 pounds for trespass. The defen- 
dant had been "treading upon plaintiff s grass and hunting for 
game," though no actual harm occurred. The court observed 
that "in a case where a man disregards every principle which 
actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to restrain him 
except large damages?" (Merest v. Harvey 1814). 
American Origins 
The development of the punitive damages doctrine in the 
United States followed the English experience. By 1791, an 
American court instructed the jury prior to its deliberations 
"not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suf- 
fering, or actual loss, but to give damages for example's sake, 
to prevent such offenses in the future [emphasis added]" 
(Coreyell v. Colbaugh 1791; see, also, Genay v. Norris 1784). 
By 1851, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that exem- 
plary, punitive, or vindictive damages were a well-estab- 
lished common law principle in tort cases that would allow 
the plaintiff to recover more than compensatory damages 
alone (Day v. Woodworth 1851). In 1886, that court reaf- 
firmed the principle that tort damages could include not only 
compensation for direct losses, but also a sum that serves as 
a "remedy for the greater wrong and injury involved in the 
apprehension of its repetition" (Barry v. Edmunds 1886). 
In addition to these primary objectives of punitive dam- 
age awards, courts occasionally have cited other purposes 
for them. Such damages sometimes are used to dampen a 
plaintiff's desire to seek revenge, as in Alcorn v. Mitchell 
(1872), in which the defendant publicly spit in the plaintiff s 
face. The court noted that, notwithstanding the minimal 
degree of actual harm, the act was "one of the greatest indig- 
nity, highly provocative of retaliation by force." Liberal 
damages in such circumstances would preserve "public tran- 
quillity ... [by] ... saving the necessity of resort to personal 
violence" (Alcorn v. Mitchell 1872). 
Other courts have noted that punitive damage awards 
encourage persons to serve as private attorneys general, pro- 
tecting society's interest in discouraging serious misconduct 
by making an example of wrongdoers. The opportunity to 
obtain such a reward offers an incentive to private parties to 
pursue the offenders, "especially when the prospective com- 
pensatory recovery is low or the expected cost of litigation 
is high" (Tuttle v. Raymond 1985). 
One commentator expanded on this view to characterize 
punitive damages as a "populist weapon" that historically has 
served to redress the imbalance of power between monarch 
and subject, railroad and passenger, or corporation and con- 
sumer. He points to consumer fraud and product liability 
cases as examples of wrongs that otherwise might go unpun- 
ished, because the recovery of actual damages alone often 
would not offset litigation expenses (Massey 1995, p. 18). 
A closely related purpose is to avoid the situation in which 
compensatory damages alone might serve as a "license" for 
a defendant to engage in deliberately harmful acts. In Funk v. 
Kerbaugh (1908) the defendant used unreasonably heavy 
explosive charges during railroad construction, knowing they 
would cause harm to the plaintiffs house and barn. Despite 
the plaintiffs request that he use lighter charges so as not to 
continue the harm, the defendant persisted, knowing that it 
would be cheaper to pay compensatory damages than to 
delay construction. A punitive damage award prevented the 
defendant from benefiting by his deliberately wrongful act. 
Contemporary Role of Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages serve two primary purposes in contempo- 
rary society: to punish wrongdoers and deter similar behav- 
ior in the future. The punishment function is obvious in that 
the defendant is required to pay moneys beyond what is nec- 
essary to compensate the victim for the damages he or she 
suffered. The punitive award must be large enough to cause 
financial pain to the defendant; hence, the award is likely to 
vary depending on the wealth of the defendant. The deter- 
rence function comes about because of the example set by 
the punitive award. This defendant, as well as others who 
might be considering the same behavior, are presumably 
deterred by the knowledge that they too will be punished 
severely if they behave like the defendant. Most jurisdic- 
tions mention both rationales when imposing punitive 
awards (Dragutsky 1994, p. 919). 
Punitive damages originated in response to intentional 
misconduct: behavior known in advance to be wrong and 
harmful. With the use of punitive damages in product liabil- 
ity litigation, the standard has changed to include gross neg- 
ligence and maliciousness. Therefore, the intent-to-harm 
component is no longer required. In addition, punitive dam- 
ages are now awarded in mass tort litigation; hence; one 
defendant can be liable for punitive damages many times for 
the same offense. Punitive damages even are awarded occa- 
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sionally in contract cases (Schwartz and Behrens 1993, p. 
1369). 
American tort law in most states embraces the idea that 
punitive damages can be used in a civil suit to punish 
wrongdoers and deter them and others from repeating such 
actions. Therefore, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979, 
s908(1)) provides that punitive damages are 
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded 
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to 
deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future. 
Owen (1976, p. 1329; see also Rustad and Koenig 1993, 
p. 1311) categorized behaviors deserving punitive damages 
20 years ago in a list that is still widely cited: 
1. Fraudulent-type misconduct-where the defendant misrepre- 
sents research data or supplies false or incomplete informa- 
tion to consumers. 
2. Knowing violation of safety standards-where the defendant 
chooses to ignore known regulations related to the product. 
3. Inadequate sting and manufacturing procedures-where the 
defendant's testing and quality control are inadequate to the 
extent that consumers are exposed to unreasonable risks. 
4. Failures to warn of known dangers before marketing-where 
the seller knows of a danger prior to sale, but does not warn 
or otherwise convey this information to consumers. 
5. Post-marketing failures to remedy known dangers-where 
the seller learns about dangers that were unknown prior to 
sale but does not warn or otherwise convey this information 
to consumers. 
Commentators have noted that though punitive damages 
still are awarded occasionally for manufacturing defects, 
most contemporary cases are based on product design 
defects or failure to warn (Butler 1996, p. 2170; Rustad and 
Koenig 1993, p. 1312). Therefore, marketing's role in puni- 
tive damages litigation continues to be critical and must be 
scrutinized carefully by firms. 
Scope of Punitive Damages in Product 
Liability Litigation 
The use of punitive damages in product liability litigation in 
the United States dates back approximately 30 years to two 
drug product cases involving falsified data and misrepresen- 
tations about product safety (Roginsky v. Richardson-Mer- 
rell 1967; Toole v. Richardson-Merrell 1967). The intro- 
duction of punitive damages into the product liability arena 
followed closely the arrival of strict liability as a theory of 
recovery in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963). 
Rustad (1992, p. 10) notes that punitive damages in prod- 
uct liability came under attack shortly after the Greenman 
decision. The Defense Research Institute distributed a 
monograph urging that punitive damages should be abol- 
ished (Duffy 1969). The Federal Interagency Task Force on 
Product Liability drafted a model product liability law in 
1979 (Rustad 1992, p. 11). Some sort of product liability act 
has been reintroduced into Congress every year since 1982, 
but no determinative action has been taken. 
Rhetoric about the punitive damages situation abounds; 
however, much of the data quoted in the popular press are 
without foundation or are traded back and forth among pub- 
lications. Galanter (1992) asserts that some of the cited sta- 
tistics are contrived. He states that the $300 billion allegedly 
spent on tort litigation is speculation by people trying to 
support predetermined positions (Galanter 1992, p. 28). 
Most of the growth in product liability litigation reported by 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) can be attributed to 
mass tort litigation (e.g., asbestos, Benedectin, Dalkon 
Shield cases), admittedly a tort problem area (GAO 1989) 
Groups, particularly defense attorneys and trade associa- 
tions, have urged that the United States reform its tort system 
because of, among other reasons, the growing number of 
punitive damages settlements. Experts claim that product 
development is inhibited because of the specter of punitive 
damages when innovative products turn out to have unfore- 
seen side effects (Drug Topics 1996). President Clinton, like 
his predecessors, has found himself under scrutiny for his 
views on product liability, particularly given his recent veto of 
a federal bill that would have limited punitive damages (Home 
Office Computing 1996; Johnson 1996; Wharton 1996). 
As the data in Table 1 indicate, punitive damages claims 
grew in popularity throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and early 
1980s. Although the past ten years have witnessed numer- 
ous calls for punitive damages reform (see, e.g., Allen 1987; 
Boutrous 1996; Business Week 1989; Duncan 1995), the 
number of punitive damages claims has remained relatively 
steady. 
Empirical studies of punitive damages also suggest that 
the problem is not as serious as some commentators imply 
(Gordon 1992). Saks (1992, p. 1254), in a review of the lit- 
erature on punitive damages, concludes that "every empiri- 
cal study of the [punitive damages] question has reached 
conclusions that, to say the least, fail to support these beliefs 
[that the problem is serious]." Rustad (1992) came to this 
conclusion after reviewing the same and other studies. 
The Rand Institute for Civil Justice studied two locations, 
Chicago and San Francisco, between 1960 and 1984. This 
study concluded that "punitive damages ... in personal injury 
cases has changed very little in 25 years" (Peterson 1987, p. 
122; see also Peterson, Sarma, and Shanley 1987). The 
American Bar Foundation sponsored a study of more than 
25,000 jury verdicts that were drawn from across the United 
States. Researchers encountered 967 product liability ver- 
dicts, 34 of which awarded punitive damages (Daniels and 
Martin 1988). They concluded that the awards were "quite 
proportionate to the actual damages" (Rustad 1992, p. 27). 
The GAO (1989) studied two years' worth of trials in five 
states and also interviewed attorneys after the trials were 
completed. The GAO opined that punitive awards "were 
neither routine nor excessively large" (Rustad 1992, p. 28). 
The GAO also found that punitive awards were reduced 
substantially in settlement conferences and because of post- 
trial appeals. Landes and Posner (1986) examined two years 
of reported product liability cases at the trial and federal 
appellate court levels and found that punitive damages were 
granted in 10 of 172 cases. The punitive awards survived 
intact in 1 case, were reduced in 3 others, and were reversed 
and remanded in the remaining 6 cases (Landes and Posner 
1986, p. 35). 
In the context of the controversy surrounding punitive 
damages, the U.S. Supreme Court has dealt with this topic 
several times in the past decade. We now review the five 
significant punitive damages decisions rendered by the 
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Table 1. Punitive Damages in Product Liability Cases 
Search 1 Search 2 
Year Federal State Total Federal State Total 
1996 101 79 180 112 81 193 
1995 95 72 167 100 82 182 
1994 87 70 157 79 69 148 
1993 96 88 184 102 95 197 
1992 100 78 178 99 89 188 
1991 93 74 167 97 87 184 
1990 67 64 131 93 64 157 
1989 86 71 157 79 71 150 
1988 70 61 131 85 57 142 
1987 65 60 125 66 57 123 
1986 90 61 151 93 59 152 
1985 68 65 133 81 68 149 
1984 56 71 127 62 58 120 
1983 41 47 88 55 48 103 
1982 39 48 87 43 36 79 
1981 29 28 57 25 29 54 
1980 15 25 40 24 23 47 
1979 13 28 41 15 20 35 
1978 10 16 26 10 9 19 
1977 9 14 23 6 16 22 
1976 10 16 26 12 8 20 
1975 10 14 24 13 7 20 
1974 6 8 14 9 7 16 
1973 6 6 12 5 2 7 
1972 0 3 3 0 3 3 
1971 0 3 3 1 4 5 
1970 2 3 5 2 2 4 
1969 1 1 2 2 3 5 
1968 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1967 1 2 3 1 1 2 
1966 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Data are derived from a 1/2/97 search of the Lexis (1997) database of reported cases. The Search 1 phrase is "punitive damage(s) (within 255 words of) prod- 
uct liability or strict liability" for each year. The Search 2 phrase is "product liability and (punitive or exemplary) (within 2 words of) damage(s)" for each 
year. These data somewhat overstate the incidence of punitive awards in recent years because not every case including the search phrases involves a punitive 
award. In some cases the court could be discussing a prior verdict whose central feature was a dispute over punitive damages. In any event, the percentage of 
cases discussing punitive damages is quite small. For example, in 1995 punitive damages were mentioned in 2253 out of more than 70,000 reported federal 
cases. Of the 2253, only 168 involved product liability or strict liability. 
Supreme Court since this topic was last examined in detail 
in the marketing literature (see Morgan 1989). Table 2 con- 
tains a summary of the punitive damages issues in these 
cases. 
Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
Involving Punitive Damages 
We provide greater detail in our discussion of the BMW case 
because the others have been analyzed in considerable detail 
in the legal and business periodical literature. 
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal (1989) 
Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) supplied roll-off waste 
collection services in Burlington, Vt., and surrounding 
areas. A former BFI employee started Kelco Disposal in 
1980 to compete with BFI. BFI offered to buy Kelco in 1982 
in response to its capturing 43% of the market. Kelco 
declined, and BFI dropped its prices to drive Kelco out of 
business. BFI did not respond to Kelco's legal threats and 
continued its reduced price policy. In spite of these tactics, 
Kelco gained 56% of the market by 1985, which resulted in 
BFI selling out to another firm. 
Kelco sued BFI in 1984 in federal district court in Ver- 
mont, alleging that BFI violated the Sherman Act by trying 
to monopolize the market and that BFI had interfered inten- 
tionally with Kelco's contractual relations, a state law tort 
claim. In a jury trial, Kelco prevailed on both claims. At a 
second trial for damages, the jury awarded $51,146 in com- 
pensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages. The 
court "awarded Kelco $153,438 in treble damages and 
$212,500 in attorney's fees and costs on the federal antitrust 
claim, or, in the alternative, $6,066,082.74 in compensatory 
and punitive damages on the state-law claim" (Browning- 
Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal 1989, p. 2913). This out- 
come was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The key appeals issue for the Supreme Court was the con- 
stitutionality of the punitive award under the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment (see, e.g., Liv- 
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Table 2. Policy Issues Raised in Recent Supreme Court Punitive Damages Cases 
Case Policy Issues 
Browning-Ferris Industries Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not limit punitive damages in civil cases 
v. Kelco Disposal (1989) between private parties. May be different if the government has a role in the litigation, either as a party 
or a beneficiary. 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to private litigants. The procedures were 
v. Haslip (1991) acceptable in this instance, resulting in a 4:1 punitive to compensatory ratio. 
TXO Products v. Due Process Clause again applies. Outcome was not grossly excessive, and procedures were not unfair. 
Alliance Resources (1993) A 526:1 punitive to compensatory ratio is allowed to stand. 
Honda Motor v. Oberg (1994) Due Process Clause again applies. Oregon's prohibition of post-trial judicial review of punitive awards 
is unconstitutional. Other Oregon procedures allowed to stand without comment. 
BMW v. Gore (1996) Due Process Clause prohibits a grossly excessive punishment. The plaintiff suffered only noneconomic 
damages, and the defendant's conduct was not sufficiently egregious to justify the punitive amount. 
ingston 1990; Sneiderman 1990; Yarab 1990). The Court 
determined that neither the Eighth Amendment nor common 
law provided any justification for overturning the trial court 
results. The Court decided that the Excessive Fines Clause 
was not applicable when the litigants were private parties 
(not government entities). The original intent of this clause 
was to limit the possible abuse of governmental prosecutor- 
ial power. The Court thus upheld the jury's decision. 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip (1991) 
An insurance agent, selling Pacific Mutual's and other 
firms' products, proposed a group health insurance program 
to cover employees of an Alabama city employing Haslip. 
The agent sent the initial premiums to the insurers, but kept 
all additional premiums. The companies sent notice of 
cancellation to the city through the agent, who did not for- 
ward them. When Haslip was hospitalized and attempted to 
use her insurance, she learned the circumstances surround- 
ing her lack of coverage. She sued the agent and the insur- 
ing company, Pacific Mutual. The jury found for the plain- 
tiff, awarding her $200,000 in compensatory damages and 
$840,000 in punitive damages. The Supreme Court of Ala- 
bama reviewed this decision and specifically upheld the 
punitive damages amount. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. 
The essence of Pacific Mutual's appeal was the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see, e.g., 
Breslo 1992; Richards 1992). The Court ruled that the jury 
had been fair in its deliberations that resulted in the punitive 
award and that juries long had been given the latitude to 
award punitive damages under common law. Therefore, the 
defendant's rights had not been violated under the Constitu- 
tion. Among other interpretations, the Haslip decision sug- 
gested that the Court had implied a limit on the punitive to 
compensatory ratio of approximately 4:1. 
TXO Products v. Alliance Resources (1993) 
TXO contracted with Alliance for the oil and gas develop- 
ment rights on a parcel of land leased by Alliance from 
another company. After learning that another party, Sig- 
nairo, had a potential claim on these rights, TXO tried to 
contract with Signairo without informing Alliance. TXO 
then engaged in several tactics to break the contract with 
Alliance, including bringing a frivolous legal action to try to 
reduce the agreed-upon royalty payments. The jury awarded 
Alliance $19,000 in compensatory damages, its costs of 
defending the lawsuit, and $10 million in punitive damages 
based on TXO's bad faith, size, and connections with a 
larger firm. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
upheld the trial court's determination. 
TXO appealed this decision, arguing that the punitive award 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment on two levels: the sum being grossly excessive (526 
times the compensatory amount) and based on an unfair pro- 
cedure. The Supreme Court affirmed the award, rejecting both 
of TXO's assertions. The Court did not offer its own criteria 
and once again noted that the outcome of a fair and reasonable 
process was entitled to a strong presumption of validity. 
In TXO the Court essentially passed on an opportunity to 
develop clear and convincing guidelines for assessing 
whether punitive damages were assessed according to 
acceptable procedures (see, e.g., Sperow 1994; Stuart 1994). 
The Court implicitly found that the procedural due process 
from Haslip-that is, proper jury instructions, adequate trial 
court review, and adequate appellate court review-should 
govern states' systems of determining punitive damages. 
The Court also indicated that the Haslip procedures were 
not minimum acceptable levels because the Court approved 
less restrictive due process procedures in TXO. The punitive 
to compensatory ratio of 526:1 convincingly surpassed the 
4:1 Haslip ratio. 
Honda Motor v. Oberg (1994) 
Here the plaintiff was riding a three-wheeled all-terrain (ATV) 
vehicle produced and sold by the defendant. While driving up 
a steep hill, the plaintiff was severely and permanently injured 
when the ATV overturned onto him. Oberg sued Honda, argu- 
ing that it should have known that the ATV was unreasonably 
and inherently dangerous. The jury found for the plaintiff and 
awarded him $5 million in punitive damages and $939,390 in 
compensatory damages, the latter reduced 20% because of the 
plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
Honda appealed, arguing that its rights under the Due 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been 
violated and that the punitive award was excessive. An 
Oregon appellate court rejected these appeals, stating that 
the jury exercised reasonable power within the bounds of 
Oregon law. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed this deci- 
sion, agreeing that the jury conformed reasonably with Ore- 
gon law. 
The Supreme Court agreed with Honda in part, thus 
reversing and remanding the case (see, e.g., Alliker 1995; 
Macario 1995; Toney 1994). The key issue was an amend- 
ment to the Oregon Constitution that prohibits post-trial 
judicial review and correction of excessive punitive awards. 
The Court found that this denial of review violated the Four- 
teenth Amendment. The Court did not go on to comment 
about or ratify the other elements of Oregon's review. The 
Oregon Supreme Court subsequently reviewed the decision 
and affirmed the appellate and trial courts' decisions (Oberg 
v. Honda Motor 1996), reinstating the $5 million punitive 
award as well as the compensatory amount. 
BMW v. Gore (1996) 
Ira Gore bought a black BMW sedan in January 1990 from 
an authorized BMW dealer in Birmingham, Ala. He drove 
the car for about nine months before taking it to a car 
detailer in order to improve its appearance. Slick, the 
detailer, noticed signs that the car had been repainted and 
mentioned this to Gore. Parts of the vehicle---quarter panels, 
top, hood, and trunk-had been repainted at BMW's facility 
in Georgia. Hearing this, Gore believed he had been cheated 
and sued BMW of North America, the American distributor 
of BMW automobiles, the German manufacturer, and the 
local dealership. Gore claimed that BMW's failure to tell 
him that the car had been repainted constituted fraud-that 
is, suppression of a material fact. 
BMW had implemented a nationwide policy in 1983 of 
repairing vehicles damaged during manufacture or trans- 
port. If the cost of repair was 3% or less of the car's sug- 
gested retail price, BMW sold the cars as new without 
informing its dealers. If repair costs exceeded 3%, the cars 
were placed in company service for a while and then sold as 
used. The cost to repair Gore's care was $601.37, approxi- 
mately 1.5% of its $40,000+ retail price. BMW asserted that 
the repaired car was as good as a new one. BMW believed a 
punitive award was improper because of its good-faith 
belief that it had no duty to disclose this minor repair to 
Gore. 
Gore claimed that having the car repainted lessened its 
value by approximately 10%; hence, he asked for compen- 
satory damages of $4,000. He also included evidence that 
BMW had sold 983 refinished cars since 1983 without dis- 
closing that they had been repainted. On the basis of the 
damage estimate of $4,000 per vehicle, Gore asked for puni- 
tive damages of $4 million, the approximate value of the 
total excess price charged by BMW. The jury in the 
Alabama state court returned a verdict favoring Gore over 
BMW of North America in the amount of $4,000 in com- 
pensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. 
BMW filed several post-trial motions, including a claim 
that its nondisclosure policy was acceptable in more than 20 
states. Some states mandated disclosure of repairs exceed- 
ing 3% of the suggested retail price, but none required dis- 
closure of lesser repairs (BMW v. Gore 1996). BMW also 
noted that its nondisclosure policy had not been challenged 
before this lawsuit was filed, thus making punitive damages 
an overly severe penalty. Before this judgment was deliv- 
ered, BMW changed its policy to avoid sales of refinished 
cars in Alabama and two other states. After the verdict, 
BMW instituted a nationwide policy of full disclosure of all 
repairs. 
The trial court denied all of BMW's motions. The 
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive award was 
not excessive in terms of constitutionally permitted limits. 
This courts did determine that the trial court was incorrect in 
calculating punitive damages on the basis of the number of 
refinished autos sold in jurisdictions other than Alabama. 
The punitive award was reduced to $2 million, though the 
court did not present any reasoning for choosing this 
amount. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, using traditional reasoning for 
invoking punitive damages, declared the $2 million to be 
grossly excessive in terms of the state's interest in punish- 
ment and deterrence. The Court mentioned three guidelines 
for assessing damages (BMW v. Gore 1996): 
1. the degree of reprehensibility, 
2. the ratio of the punitive damage award to the actual harm 
inflicted on the plaintiff, and 
3. the state's sanctions for comparable misconduct. 
This case seemed to have been decided on the first guide- 
line. Gore suffered only minor economic damages because 
he purchased an automobile that had been refinished. He 
was not seriously injured or physically harmed in any way. 
Although this case marks the first time in decades that a 
punitive award has been overturned, the decision did little to 
guide legislatures crafting statutes to clarify punitive dam- 
ages guidelines (Pappas 1996). 
Public Policy Issues Emerging from 
Supreme Court Decisions 
Computing the Punitive Award 
The basic public policy question is whether punitive dam- 
ages should be limited in some sense: an absolute amount, 
in relationship to compensatory damages, or as a percentage 
of the defendant's financial situation. A related question is 
whether punitive damages would continue to function as a 
punishment and deterrent if some limitation is approved. 
An absolute dollar limit makes punitive damages pre- 
dictable for purposes of decision making. A company pon- 
dering an unlawful act, for example, concealing known 
product dangers through failure to warn, will be able to 
quantify the possible punitive damages exposure. If the 
profits from the proposed concealment are large enough, the 
anticipated punitive penalty will not deter the behavior. This 
outcome defeats the fundamental deterrence purpose of 
punitive damages (see Partlett 1996). 
Tying punitive damages to compensatory damages also 
diminishes the effectiveness of punitive damages. Proposals 
of this type have surfaced several times in recent years, typ- 
ically calling for punitive to compensatory ratios of 2:1 or 
3:1 (see, e.g., Diveley 1995). This ratio reasoning emerged 
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from the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip (1991, p. 
23) decision when the Court noted that the nearly 4:1 ratio 
was "close to the line." Comparisons like this divert the 
attention from the defendant's behavior to the plaintiff's 
injury, essentially "skirting the policies of punitive dam- 
ages" (Toney 1994, p. 681). Ratios are ineffective when the 
plaintiff managed to avoid being harmed in spite of the 
intentional conduct of the defendant or if the plaintiff's 
injuries are economic only (see, e.g., TXO Products v. 
Alliance Resources 1993). 
Several states already have developed limits for punitive 
awards. Diveley (1995, p. 31) notes that more than a dozen 
states have enacted legislation to curb punitive damages. 
The typical statute specifies an absolute limit, usually 
$250,000 or two or three times the compensatory amount, 
whichever is less. Alabama, which has a notorious history of 
punitive awards, has the following: 
s6-11-21. Punitive damages not to exceed $250,000; an award 
of punitive damages shall not exceed $250,000, unless it is 
based upon one or more of the following: 
1. A pattern or practice of intentional wrongful conduct, even 
though the damage or injury was inflicted only on the plain- 
tiff; or, 
2. Conduct involving actual malice other than fraud or bad faith 
not a part of a pattern or practice; or, 
3. Libel, slander, or defamation (Code of Alabama s6-11-21; 
cf. Florida Statutes, Ch. 768.73). 
Calculating punitive damages on the basis of the defen- 
dant's wealth would allow defendants to anticipate punitive 
awards. Even so, the prospect of a substantial punitive 
penalty would still act as a deterrent. Allowing the defen- 
dant's wealth into the formula for punitive damages is a 
controversial step (Abraham and Jeffries 1989). The plain- 
tiff's bar generally supports this view, whereas the defense 
bar opposes it. Commentators have suggested a compromise 
in that wealth would not be used to establish the punitive 
award but instead would be used to judge whether the award 
was excessive after it was set (see, e.g., Kirgis 1993; 
Schwartz and Behrens 1993). This suggestion seems to 
overlook both punishment and deterrence goals. Without 
knowing whether the punitive award actually was going to 
harm the defendant financially, the jury would not know the 
appropriate level of punishment. If punitive damages are to 
be limited in some manner, we support a percentage limit, 
rather than an absolute limit, on the defendant's wealth. 
Constitutional Issues 
Two major constitutional questions have been raised by the 
cases discussed herein: the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Four- 
teenth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment also can be 
invoked in those cases in which a defendant finds itself pay- 
ing punitive damages more than once for a common offense, 
such as a mass tort (Macchiarola 1996; McKown 1995, p. 
459). The initial paragraph of Browning-Ferris Industries v. 
Kelco Disposal (1989, p. 263) deals with the Excessive 
Fines Clause: 
This Court has never held, or even intimated, that the Eighth 
Amendment serves as a check on the power of a jury to award 
damages in a civil case. Rather, our concerns in applying the 
Eighth Amendment have been with criminal process and with 
direct actions initiated by government to inflict punishment. 
Awards of punitive damages do not implicate these concerns. 
We therefore hold, on the basis of the history and purpose of the 
Eighth Amendment, hat its Excessive Fines Clause does not 
apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private 
parties. 
The meaning of this citation is clear; however, recent 
statutory developments are again raising Eighth Amend- 
ment issues. Several states are now parties to punitive dam- 
ages awards (Hurd and Zollers 1994; Stevens 1994). That is, 
plaintiffs must now share some portion of punitive damages 
awards in several states. For example, the following word- 
ing comes from a 1996 Georgia statute: 
(e)(2) Seventy-five percent of any amounts awarded under this 
subsection as punitive damages, less a proportionate part of the 
costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees, all as 
determined by the trial judge, shall be paid into the treasury of 
the state ... the state shall have all rights due a judgment credi- 
tor until such judgment is satisfied and shall stand on equal foot- 
ing with the plaintiff of the original case in securing a recovery 
after payment to the plaintiff of damages awarded other than as 
punitive damages (Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 
s51-12-5.1). 
Such laws have come into being partially in response to 
the criticism that punitive awards represent an undeserved 
windfall to plaintiffs and actually could encourage litigation 
(see, e.g., Schwartz 1988). To better serve the punishment 
and deterrence goals, society at large should share in the 
punitive award rather than just the plaintiff who already 
recovers through compensatory damages. Such statutes also 
raise certain difficulties, such as when litigants reach a set- 
tlement exceeding the compensatory request, but less than 
the sum of the compensatory plus punitive request. How is 
the settlement apportioned among attorney fees, compen- 
satory damages, and punitive damages? 
The Due Process Clause was addressed in Pacific Mutual 
v. Haslip (1991, p. 18): 
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright 
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitu- 
tionally unacceptable that would fit every case. We can say, 
however, that general concerns of reasonableness and adequate 
guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly 
enter into the constitutional calculus. 
The Court has not articulated what amounts to proper due 
process; however, the Court did note that Alabama had 
developed seven useful criteria to assess the adequacy of a 
punitive award (Haslip 1991, pp. 21-22): 
1. Whether there is a reasonable relationship between the puni- 
tive damages award and the harm likely to result from the 
defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has 
occurred; 
2. The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the 
duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any con- 
cealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past 
conduct; 
3. The profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and 
the desirability of removing that profit and of having the 
defendant also sustain a loss; 
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4. The "financial position" of the defendant; 
5. All the costs of litigation; 
6. The imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its 
conduct, these to be taken in mitigation; and 
7. The existence of other civil awards against the defendant for 
the same conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation. 
If we add to this list a mandatory post-trial review of the 
punitive award by the trial court and a set of jury instruc- 
tions that explains the role of punitive damages, we have a 
workable list of due process guarantees. The appeals process 
provides for another level of review. 
Other Procedural Issues 
Procedural precaution is the key to preserving punitive dam- 
ages as a viable punishment and deterrent. The punishment 
aspect of punitive damages is a criminal concept, and crimi- 
nal law employs substantial protection of the defendant's 
due process rights (Forward 1993, p. 1250). Legal experts 
have suggested two additional areas for improving or safe- 
guarding the punitive damages process: raising the level of 
proof required for awarding punitive damages and separat- 
ing the determination of compensatory damages from the 
assessment of punitive damages. 
The Haslip (1991, p. 23, note 11) Court noted the strength 
of a higher standard of proof: 
We have considered the arguments raised by Pacific Mutual and 
some of its amici as to the constitutional necessity of imposing 
a standard of proof of punitive damages higher than "prepon- 
derance of the evidence." There is much to be said in favor of a 
State's requiring ... a standard of "clear and convincing evi- 
dence" or, even, "beyond a reasonable doubt," as in the criminal 
context. 
In the lexicon of courts, "clear and convincing" falls 
between "preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a 
reasonable doubt," the latter being the criminal standard of 
proof. Nearly half of the states have gone on to develop 
statutory language embracing the "clear and convincing" 
standard. The 1996 Georgia statute, discussed previously, 
states: 
(b) Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions 
in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, 
wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would 
raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences 
(Official Code of Georgia Annotated, s51-12-5.1). 
Concern for standard of proof has led to recommenda- 
tions that trials involving punitive damages requests be 
bifurcated. The first part of the trial would be the determi- 
nation of the defendant's culpability and the appropriate 
compensatory award. The second part would deal with the 
punitive damages question and its related higher level of 
proof. Experts contend that this approach would prevent evi- 
dence related to the punitive award from biasing the jury's 
overall assessment of guilt and compensatory damages 
(Comment 1996; Schwartz and Behrens 1996). 
Marketing Implications 
The guideline, "Do not intentionally harm consumers," cap- 
tures the essence of proper marketing behavior; however, 
this standard provides nothing in the way of managerial 
action implications. Timely communication of information 
is the key to avoiding situations in which consumers have 
been injured by faulty products in a manner meriting puni- 
tive damages. During the product development process, a 
product's dangerous propensities should be cataloged and 
regularly brought to the attention of managers. Knowledge 
of these hazardous properties arises during in-house design 
sessions, through marketing testing of prototypes, and even- 
tually from customer feedback about usage situations. 
Salespeople are another valuable source of safety informa- 
tion because of their regular contact with customers. 
A company has two choices in terms of dealing with 
unsafe features or perilous in-use situations. It can design 
away the problems or provide warnings to consumers about 
the potential dangers. Design solutions are clearly superior 
to warnings because the former eliminate the danger, 
whereas warnings rely on consumers to read, process, and 
heed warnings. The use of warnings shifts safety responsi- 
bility from marketers to consumers who could ignore (dis- 
tracted or busy users) or misunderstand (complex language, 
illiteracy, or language barriers) warnings. We believe that 
permitting such shifting of responsibility to consumers con- 
stitutes unacceptable public policy. Warnings should be 
used only if dangers cannot be designed out of products or 
if the dangers are an inherent part of useful products (e.g., 
hammers, power tools). 
Given known dangers, marketers must convey this infor- 
mation to consumers, especially information in the com- 
pany's possession prior to marketing the product. Conscious 
failure to warn of known dangers is tantamount to inviting 
punitive damages claims. The entire communications pro- 
gram should focus on transmitting the seriousness of known 
dangers. Print and broadcast advertisements should include 
disclosures about the dangers, though such disclosures can 
reduce the impact of advertisements. In addition, ad content 
should not encourage or imply unsafe product use, particu- 
larly use that stretches a product to the limits of its design. 
Likewise, salespeople should not mitigate the impact of 
warnings by their statements to prospects and customers 
during sales calls. Salesperson statements that are wrong or 
intentionally misleading readily could lead to a punitive 
damages award. 
The final step in eliminating punitive awards is to have a 
recall program in place so that it can be implemented 
quickly if necessary. Recall programs, by necessity, imme- 
diately remove dangerous products from consumers' hands. 
When the company hears about product users being hurt by 
a product and then decides to recall the item, it is too late to 
develop the recall program. An effective, planned recall pro- 
gram is also a signal that a company is concerned about con- 
sumer safety, a good position to be in if punitive damages 
litigation arises. 
Conclusion 
Although the constitutional arguments have not been 
debated fully by the Supreme Court, the Court at least has 
indicated that it is going to examine procedural due process 
in cases involving disputes about punitive damages. There- 
fore, over time, the Court's position on due process will 
evolve, albeit perhaps slowly. States therefore should 
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concentrate on developing concrete laws governing jury 
instructions about assessing punitive damages, trial court 
review of jury decisions, appellate review of trial court 
results, and State Supreme Courts' reviews of appellate 
adjudication. Developing specific guidelines is well beyond 
the scope of this analysis; however, the Court clearly has 
indicated that such procedures are necessary. 
Legislative action is preferred over intermittent Supreme 
Court decisions. Courts, by the nature of their function, see the 
specific facts of a case and any precedent brought into the 
courtroom. Moreover, courts at different levels or circuits 
could disagree on how to apply Supreme Court decisions to 
cases involving similar fact situations. Analysis of recent post 
BMW cases suggests that federal courts more than state courts 
are cutting punitive damage awards (MacLachlan 1997). Leg- 
islatures have access to much more information, such as 
experts on all sides of an issue, reviews of all relevant litigation 
both within and outside the state, and a sense of the preferences 
of the citizens. All of this provides a useful backdrop for puni- 
tive damages reform that accommodates divergent views. 
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